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Heidegger’s Failure to Overcome
Transcendental Philosophy
Eric S. Nelson
The Problem of Transcendental Philosophy
John Searle has complained that “it ought to arouse our suspicions
that people who spend enormous efforts on interpreting
[Heidegger’s] work disagree on the fundamental question whether
he was an idealist.”1 Scholars of Heidegger’s philosophy have
similarly been unable to agree whether or to what extent he was
committed to transcendental philosophy, which Kant defined as
the analysis of the necessary conditions of possible experience in
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general, or whether he overcame it in a “radical” new thinking of
being and its history.2
The continuing disagreement concerning the role of transcendental
philosophy in his thought can be attributed in large part to Heidegger
himself. It reflects his shifting and ultimately inconsistent positions
concerning his relationship with the transcendental heritage. In this
chapter, I trace Heidegger’s changing and ambiguous relationship with
“transcendental philosophy,” which he defined at various points in
relation to the philosophy of the subject and subjectivity, reflective-
representational thinking, and the horizonal understanding of meaning.
As he recounted in the 1963 lecture “My Way into Phenomenology,”
Heidegger’s philosophical training was deeply shaped by the transcendental
philosophies of Neo-Kantianism (Heinrich Rickert) and phenomenology
(Edmund Husserl) that he studied at the University of Freiburg.3 Despite
or perhaps because of this education, Heidegger would repeatedly endeavor
to distance himself from and break with the transcendental paradigm of his
Freiburg teachers, Rickert and Husserl, while still tacitly relying upon it
and at times—even in his later works when it should have long been
overcome—reverting to its language and argumentative strategies.4
2 For instance, Hubert L. Dreyfus stresses Heidegger’s break with transcendental thought:
“Heidegger developed his hermeneutic phenomenology in opposition to Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology.” See Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 2. Cristina Lafont emphasizes the anti-transcendental nature of
Heidegger’s “linguistic idealism” and the ontological difference, which makes the distinction
between the empirical and transcendental impossible, in Heidegger, Language, and World-
Disclosure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 17. Skepticism about Heidegger’s
success at overcoming transcendental philosophy is developed by Karl-Otto Apel; see “Meaning-
Constitution and Justification of Validity: Has Heidegger Overcome Transcendental Philosophy by
History of Being?” in Karl-Otto Apel (ed.) From a Transcendental-Semiotic Point of View
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 103–21. A cogent case for Heidegger’s continuity
with transcendental philosophy is made in Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Transcendentalism,”
Research in Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (2005): 29–54. These are two Heideggerian voices, according to
Steven G. Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental
Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 9.
3 GA 14:93–101.
4On Heidegger’s relation to Husserl, see Leslie MacAvoy, “Heidegger and Husserl,” in
Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, rev. edn, ed. François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London:
Bloomsbury, 2016), 135–42.
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Heidegger engaged in a number of attempts to reformulate trans-
cendental philosophy, such as in terms of fundamental ontology and
world-disclosure in the second half of the 1920s, and to break with
transcendental philosophy. An early attempt to disentangle himself
from the transcendental paradigm can be seen in his early post-
war turn toward existence- and life-philosophy and hermeneutics,
which he developed in particular through his reading of Dilthey.5
Heidegger attempted in his “hermeneutics of factical life” to over-
come transcendental philosophy and what he depicted as its static,
ahistorical conception of the constitution of meaning, through an
interpretive-existential analysis of concrete situated existence.6 His
lecture courses of the early 1920s promised a radical breakthrough
and return to life in its very facticity. Theodore Kisiel has described
how Heidegger’s early project was adjusted through his reappropria-
tion of transcendental philosophy as fundamentally ontological
and his explicit return to transcendental philosophy, ontologically
understood, in the mid-1920s during the period of Being and Time
(1927) and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929).7 During
5 For a detailed discussion of Dilthey’s significance for the early Heidegger, see Eric S. Nelson,
“The World Picture and its Conflict in Dilthey and Heidegger,” Humana Mente: Journal of
Philosophical Studies 18 (2011): 19–38; Eric S. Nelson, “Heidegger and Dilthey: Language,
History, and Hermeneutics,” in Horizons of Authenticity in Phenomenology, Existentialism, and
Moral Psychology, ed. Hans Pedersen and Megan Altman (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 109–28.
6On the context of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, see Theodore Kisiel, “On the Genesis of
Heidegger’s Formally Indicative Hermeneutics of Facticity,” in Rethinking Facticity, ed. François
Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 41–67; Eric
S. Nelson, “Questioning Practice: Heidegger, Historicity, and the Hermeneutics of Facticity,”
Philosophy Today 44 (2001): 150–9.
7 Cf. Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993), 9. Kisiel depicts the development of Heidegger’s Being and Time through
“three drafts”: (i) the “hermeneutical” or “Dilthey”-influenced draft that reflects his early project
of a hermeneutics of factical life (1915–21); (ii) a “phenomenological-ontological” draft that relies
on working through Aristotle’s ontology and a renewed engagement and struggle with Husserl’s
phenomenology (1921–24); and (iii) a quasi-transcendental and Kantian draft (1924–27). Being
and Time’s failure motivated Heidegger’s movement away from Kant toward a renewed thinking
of the anti-transcendental ontological motivations, such as the “it worlds” and the primordial
happening (“es ereignet sich”) and upsurge of a pre-intentional and pre-theoretical “it” (es) or
“there” (da), of the first draft without its existential and life-philosophical dimensions.
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this period, Heidegger identified the inner truth of transcendental
philosophy with the fundamental ontology of being.
A second example of Heidegger’s break with transcendental philosophy,
and the most frequently disputed example in the literature, is the so-called
“turning” (Kehre) in themid-1930s, understood as an attempt to overcome
the lingering transcendental character of Being and Time, which is con-
cerned with the “ontology of Dasein” or, “in Kantian terms,” a “prelimin-
ary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.”8 According to
Heidegger’s later self-interpretation in the 1930s, Being and Time had
failed to address—or was in being-historical “errancy” (seinsgeschichtliche
Irre) concerning—the genuine question of being (Seinsfrage) by overem-
phasizing the constitutive role of the subject and its distinctive temporality.
The thereness of “being-there” (Dasein) was not yet thought radically
enough. Heidegger identified transcendental philosophy after the turn,
linking it with his wider “history of being” (Geschichte des Seins), with the
priority of the subject and subjectivity that he associated with problems of
modernity—rooted in the origins and historical unfolding of Western
metaphysics—in works such as “The Age of the World Picture” (1938).9
After the “turn,”Heidegger continued to alternate between the rhetoric
of radically overcoming transcendental philosophy—for its subjective,
horizonal, reflective-representational, and modernist character—and the
possibility of an alternative conception of transcendental constitution that
occurred through the “event” (Ereignis) of being, world, and history,
rather than through the analysis of the conditions of possibility of the
subject. Heidegger did not overcome his ambiguous relationship with the
transcendental tradition and could not overcome transcendental philosophy.
This clarifies why, despite his own self-interpretations, the transcendental
interpretation of Heidegger’s context and—both early and later—works
remains trenchant.10
8 SZ 24. Page numbers for SZ refer to the German edition.
9Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 83–4.
On the problematic of the subject and subjectivity in Heidegger, see François Raffoul, Heidegger
and the Subject (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1998).
10 For transcendental approaches to Heidegger’s thought, see for instance: Transcendental Heidegger,




Searle’s suspicions concerning the implicit idealism of Heidegger’s phenom-
enology have significant historical precedents. In one of the earliest critiques
of the phenomenology articulated in Being and Time, Georg Misch in his
Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung der
Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl argued for the inherently
subjective-idealistic character of the phenomenological movement. Misch,
who was familiar with the development of Heidegger’s thought throughout
this period, identified Heidegger’s position with a subjective, Fichtean-style
ethical “idealism of freedom.” Günther Anders would rechristen it an “ide-
alism of unfreedom” (Idealismus der Unfreiheit) in his 1937 critique of
Heidegger’s philosophy in relation to his involvement with National
Socialism.11 Misch’s description corresponds to Heidegger’s “metaphysics
of freedom” phase during the late 1920s and early 1930s, whichwas unfolded
through his interpretation of German idealism and Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph Schelling in particular.12 Indeed, instead of keeping his distance,
Heidegger had an affirmative sense of the achievements of German idealism,
as a philosophical elevation from which later generations have fallen.13
“Heidegger’s Transcendentalism,” Research in Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (2005): 29–54; Dermot
Moran, “Dasein as Transcendence in Heidegger and the Critique of Husserl,” in Heidegger in the
Twenty-First Century, ed. Tziovanis Georgakis and Paul J. Ennis (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 23–45.
11Misch described how Heidegger “is ethical-idealistically positioned, while an objective idealistic
orientation is revealed in Dilthey (ethisch-idealistisch eingestellt ist, während bei Dilthey die objektiv-
idealistische Einstellung sich darin verriete),” in Georg Misch, Lebensphilosophie und
Phänomenologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl,
2nd edn (Leipzig: Teubner, 1931), 29–30. Cf. Günther Anders, Über Heidegger (München: Beck,
2001), 28; see also the discussion of Misch’s critique of Heidegger’s idealism in Eric S. Nelson,
“Dilthey, Heidegger und die Hermeneutik des faktischen Lebens,” in Diltheys Werk und seine
Wirkung, ed. Gunter Scholtz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 103.
12On Schelling’s significance for Heidegger’s thinking of freedom and imagination in this key
period of transition between Being and Time and the turn, see Christopher S. Yates, The Poetic
Imagination in Heidegger and Schelling (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).
13 See GA 40:34; Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2014), 45.
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Jürgen Habermas, whose 1954 doctoral work was on the contradictions
between history and the absolute in Schelling, connected Heidegger’s
thought with idealism, which unlike classical German idealism relativizes
rather than grounds rational knowledge. Habermas repeatedly depicted
Heidegger’s early phenomenology of Dasein as a subjective decisionism
and his later thinking of being as a form of “linguistic idealism” that
prioritizes “the world-disclosing function of language.”14 Habermas con-
cluded that Heidegger is beholden to the worst elements of the idealistic
heritage, temporalizing and relativizing it, and is unable to take an inter-
subjective and communicative turn that would rehabilitate the rational
claims of transcendental philosophy.15
Searle maintains in his essay “The Phenomenological Illusion” a
position concerning phenomenology not unlike that of Habermas in
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. He argues that in actual fact
the entire classical phenomenological tradition is committed to
semantic idealism or, if we abandon the claim of idealism as overly
polemical, a perspectival reduction of knowledge and truth claims to a
point of view or language game. Searle describes the semantic position
thus: “a view is idealist in this semantic sense if it does not allow for
irreducibly de re references to objects. All references to objects are
interpreted as being within the scope of some phenomenological
operator.”16 According to Searle’s argument, this description encom-
passes not only Husserl’s conception of the fundamental character of
the intentionality of consciousness but also less obviously idealistic
operators such as Dasein (being-there) in Heidegger or the body in
Merleau-Ponty.
Searle’s argument appears at first glance overly simplistic and
in need of complication, given the notions of passivity and
14 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2001), 146. Also see Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf
Vorlesungen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), 168.
15William D. Blattner has extensively argued that Heidegger is a “temporal idealist.” See his
Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
16 Searle, “Phenomenological Illusion,” 107. For his depiction of phenomenology as a semanti-
cally idealist or quasi-idealistic perspectivalism, see 128–32.
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sedimentation in Husserl; of facticity, thrownness, and being
beyond Dasein’s operations of meaning and sense-making in
Heidegger; of the entwinement of the body in the flesh of
the world in Merleau-Ponty; or of the priority of alterity in
Levinas. Classical phenomenology cannot be identified with sub-
jective or objective idealism, even if it might well be explicitly (as
in Husserl) or implicitly committed to underlying premises of
transcendental philosophy.17
Searle asserts that Husserl’s transcendental philosophy emphasizes
meaning (“what is said”) over reality (“the thing” itself): “all of his
talk about the transcendental ego and the primacy of consciousness
is . . . a part of his rejection of the idea that what I have been calling
the basic facts are really basic.”18 Searle claims in addition: “trans-
cendental subjectivity for Husserl does not depend on the basic
facts; rather, it is the other way round.”19 Searle’s description
conflates a necessary condition of x with the reduction of x to
that necessary condition; that is, the idea that the intentional and
proto-intentional constitution of meaning is necessary for there
to be meaningful facts for us (what he calls the semantic) with
the idea that real things are predetermined and constructed through
the constitution of meaning (what he calls the de re independent
reality).
The notions of transcendental conditions in Kant and transcen-
dental constitution in Husserl did not entail the rejection of
experientially encountering things and scientifically explaining
the empirical world, which correspond to the pre-predicative experi-
ence of the life-world (Lebenswelt), on the one hand, and the theore-
tical idealization of the sciences, on the other hand, as shown in
Husserl’s late works such as Experience and Judgment and The Crisis
17 I argue that Heidegger and Levinas never overcome the premises of transcendental philosophy
in Eric S. Nelson, “Biological and Historical Life: Heidegger between Levinas and Dilthey,” in
The Science, Politics, and Ontology of Life-philosophy, ed. Scott M. Campbell and Paul W. Bruno
(London: Continuum, 2013), 15–29.
18 Searle, “Phenomenological Illusion,” 124.
19 Searle, “Phenomenological Illusion,” 125.
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of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936).
Husserl demonstrated how this is possible without appealing to
the metaphysical realist’s mystical positing of a nonconstituted
or unexperienced and uninterpreted reality (the de re disconnected
from the de dicto).
To complicate the picture further, Searle’s criticisms of Husserl
overlap with Heidegger’s and those of other later phenomenological
critics: the fundamental intentionality and relationality of conscious-
ness, without which there would not be meaning, acting or knowing
for Husserl, is construed as predetermining the entirety of reality when
it is making the experience and interpretation of reality possible.
Intentionality does not isolate the ego or mind in itself; it designates
the irreducible constitutive relationality that allows humans to encoun-
ter things and “know facts” in meaningful ways precisely because
consciousness has relational and intentional characteristics that make
these processes possible.
Phenomenology cannot be semantic idealism in Searle’s sense.
Husserl did of course describe his phenomenology as transcendental
idealism and transcendental subjectivism. This indicates the difference
between: (i) idealism1 as the constitution of all—including material and
natural—reality out of the subject, or the ideational (semantic) nature of
all reality (which Husserl never maintained); and (ii) idealism2 as the
constitution of sense and meaning from the fundamental non-dual
co-relationality of subject and object disclosed through the phenomen-
ological reductions:
Consciousness describes how the world becomes manifest: The attempt to
conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe
of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two
being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensi-
cal. They belong together essentially; and as belonging together essentially,
they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion; trans-
cendental subjectivity.20





Heidegger repeatedly sought to redefine and/or break from and overcome
the idealism of his mentors and of the Western metaphysical tradition. In
these attempts, it is evident that Heidegger—who declared himself a
follower of the “realist” Husserl of the Logical Investigations (1900–01)—
shared some of Searle’s concerns about the idealizing tendencies of
Husserl’s phenomenology throughout his lecture courses of the 1920s
and his later break with the transcendentalism of Being and Time itself.
Being and Time, however Heidegger’s thought is ultimately inter-
preted, is clearly composed in the context of the project of transcenden-
tal philosophy, as can be seen in the text itself. His account of the
temporality of Dasein in Being and Time aimed at elucidating “time as
the transcendental horizon for the question of being.”21 The language of
“transcendental horizons” is borrowed from Husserl. The term “hori-
zon” indicates how the transcendental dimension cannot consist purely
in a description of the activities of the ego and subject, to the extent that
the subject is referred to ever wider conditions and horizons of meaning-
constitution and genesis. In Heidegger’s argument, time cannot be said
to be constituted by the subject, as existentially reinterpreted temporality
constitutes the very sensibility of Dasein’s being from the unchosen
thrownness of birth to the inappropriable facticity of death, which
indicates two occasions that define human Dasein while defying the
meaning and sense-making activities of the subject.
Nonetheless, in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics, the notion of the transcendental is pushed in other directions
that Husserl rejected as a betrayal of transcendental phenomenology
for the sake of a renewed metaphysics (in his critique of Heidegger’s
ontological language) and philosophical anthropology (in his criticism
of Heidegger’s use of existential language).22 Husserl argued that Being
21 SZ 39.
22 See Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation
with Heidegger (1927–1931), Collected Works, vol. 6 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1997).
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and Time failed because of its departure from, rather than its lingering
commitment to, the philosophy of transcendental subjectivity. Heidegger
had reified phenomenology into an existential anthropology.23
The continuing affinities and the growing distances between Husserl
and Heidegger are apparent in the latter’s interpretation of the trans-
cendental in passages such as this one: “Being is the transcendens pure and
simple. The transcendence of the being of Dasein is a distinctive one
since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individua-
tion. Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental
knowledge. Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is veritas
transcendentalis.”24 What is noteworthy about this passage in this con-
text is that Heidegger is harkening to the scholastic, presumably more
ontological, sense of “transcendental” in this passage and connecting it
with the more or less existential question of the singular and unique
being of the self in its individuation. Heidegger’s 1915 qualifying dis-
sertation had concerned the problem of the relation between universal
categories of meaning and the form of individuation (the haecceitas or
“thisness”) in scholasticism.25 As “existential,” categories are only mean-
ingful insofar as they are enacted and embodied in diverse ways of being;
as “ontological,” they concern the question of how being is and how
beings are rather than the issue of how to access epistemically their
reality through knowledge.
Neo-Kantian and Husserlian transcendental philosophy had for
Heidegger prioritized the question of knowledge and the knowing subject
in its concern for the logical and epistemic conditions of possibility.26 It is
23Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology, 505; see also Edmund Husserl,
“Phänomenologie und Anthropologie,” in Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937), Gesammelte
Werke XXVII, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 164–81.
See my discussion in Eric S. Nelson, “What Is Missing? The Incompleteness and Failure of
Heidegger’s Being and Time,” in Division III of Heidegger’s Being and Time: The Unanswered
Question of Being, ed. Lee Braver (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 210.
24 SZ 38.
25GA 1:203, 253. On the significance of haecceitas for Heidegger, see John van Buren, The Young
Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 105–7.
26 See, for instance, GA 58:180.
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this understanding of the complicity of the transcendental, subjectivity,
and the epistemological essence of modern philosophy since Descartes that
Heidegger would place into question by rethinking them in more primor-
dial ontological and life-existential senses in the 1920s and in endeavoring
to confront and overcome them altogether in his later thinking.
Heidegger’s controversial redescription of Kant’s conception of the
transcendental as concerned with the ontological question of being
instead of the epistemological problem of possible knowledge developed
through his readings of medieval scholastic philosophy, its antecedent
origins in Aristotle, and his perhaps polemical reinterpretation of Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason as an ontological work, which brought him into
dispute with the Neo-Kantian reading of Kant. Heidegger would debate
with Ernst Cassirer over the very character of the critical philosophy in
the Swiss town of Davos in 1929.27 Kant’s transcendental philosophy
becomes in Heidegger’s reading a general ontology: nothing less than the
ontological determination of the region of all beings.28 The question
concerning possible conditions is primarily a question of being
(Seinsfrage) that Kant had failed to pose radically enough and with
adequate self-understanding.
Heidegger rethought the question of the conditions of possibility as the
question of the possibility of essence in his confrontation with Kant’s critical
philosophy, which would soon turn toward German idealism as a step be-
yond Kant. In the context of his reading of Hegel and Schelling, transcen-
dental philosophy will no longer be rethought as ontology. Heidegger
would abandon the project of Being and Time (1927) and Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics (1929) as insufficiently radical. Transcendental
philosophy belongs to the very forgetting of the ontological question of
27On the historical context and intellectual implications of the Davos debates, see Michael
Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (LaSalle: Open Court
Publishing, 2000); Peter Eli Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2010).
28GA 25:58. Compare Frank Schalow, “Heidegger and Kant: Three Guiding Questions,” in
Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, rev. edn, ed. François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London:
Bloomsbury, 2016), 105–11. Compare my discussion of Schalow’s analysis of Heidegger’s Kant in
Nelson, “What Is Missing?” 202.
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being, as it is tied to the abstract understanding of subjectivity introduced
through René Descartes’s conception of the ego cogito. Subjectivity, and the
transcendental philosophy associated with it as the “philosophy of subjec-
tivity,” are inherently bound together and to be overcome, for the mature
Heidegger.29
To the extent that Being and Time is still indebted to and haunted by
the transcendental perspective, it is a failure and necessarily incomplete,
and yet, in Heidegger’s self-interpretation, it is a meaningful step towards
his thinking and history of being that emerged in the 1930s.30 Even
though Being and Time attempted to overcome an ahistorical and abstract
consciousness in favor of historical-concrete existence, it remained within
the reifying and false abstractions of the tendency of transcendental
thinking.31 Transcendental philosophy is only one more name among
others for the philosophy of the modern subject that is the culmination of
the history of metaphysics and its forgetfulness of being.32
Heidegger and advocates of his later thought maintained that his new
transformative thinking signifies an overcoming of transcendental phi-
losophy.33 Each time Heidegger further developed his thinking, he
29On transcendental philosophy as the philosophy of subjectivity, see GA 14:96; on subjectivity
and modernity, see GA 67:242.
30On Heidegger’s conception of the history of being, see Eric S. Nelson, “History as Decision and
Event in Heidegger,” Arhe 4, no. 8 (2007): 97–115; Eric S. Nelson, “Heidegger, Levinas, and the
Other of History,” in Between Levinas and Heidegger, ed. John Drabinski and Eric S. Nelson
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014), 51–72.
31Martin Heidegger, Briefe an Max Müller und andere Dokumente, ed. Holger Zaborowski and
Anton Bösl (Freiburg and München: Alber, 2003), 102.
32GA 48:75. For a justification of idealism as a crucial interpretation of modern self-reflexivity
and freedom, see Robert B. Pippin, Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
33On Husserl’s critique of Heidegger, see Steven G. Crowell, “Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest
on a Mistake? An Essay on Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology,” Husserl Studies 18,
no. 2 (2002): 123–40; Sebastian Luft, “Husserl’s Concept of the ‘transcendental person’: Another Look
at the Husserl–Heidegger Relationship,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13, no. 2 (2005):
141–77. On the transition from Dasein to Sein and Heidegger’s later critique of the philosophy of the
subject, compare Bret W. Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2006), 197; Patricia J. Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects, Utopia, and
Recognition: Kristeva, Heidegger, Irigaray (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 188.
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associated his previous phases with the lingering traces of transcendental
philosophy. It should be asked: Did Heidegger overcome transcendental
philosophy in and through the turn and his mature thought, and is it
necessary to overcome it? A critical reading of the entirety of his works
indicates that it is question-worthy whether he ever overcame his ambig-
uous relationship with his transcendental heritage. it is perhaps the
case that transcendental philosophy continues to be the best way to
make sense of his projects despite his own anti-transcendental self-
interpretations.
Three Attempts to Rethink Transcendental
Philosophy
We will now briefly and schematically consider three examples of
Heidegger’s attempts to reconsider transcendental thought: his early
project of a hermeneutics of facticity, his thinking of world-constitution
and disclosure as an approach to the question of meaning, and his being-
historical thinking of the event and history of being, which is supposed
to overcome his earlier transcendentalism as well as that of the western
metaphysical tradition.
The Hermeneutics of Factical Life
First, beginning with his early post-war interest in life-philosophy and
hermeneutics (Dilthey), Heidegger attempted to “overcome” transcen-
dental philosophy and its “static,” ahistorical, idealizing conception of
constitution through a hermeneutics of factical life, only to return to an
explicitly transcendental-horizonal language in the period of Being and
Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. It is noteworthy that he
recurrently rejected transcendental philosophy and then would return to
it by employing its language and strategies. An early example of this
ambivalence is his early project of a hermeneutics of facticity or factical
life. He contrasted a philosophy that sought to clarify the factical
conditions of life and lived-experience with the dead and empty
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abstractions of a transcendental philosophy that was intrinsically limited
in its capacity to articulate the structures of factical life immanently from
out of itself.34
For instance, he claimed in an early criticism of Husserl that “the
being is pure because it is defined as ideal; that is, not real being.”35
Husserl’s reductions draw from “the initially given concrete individua-
tion of a stream of experience what is called the pure field of conscious-
ness, that is, a field which is no longer concrete and individual, but
pure.”36 Thus, in emphasizing ideality instead of facticity, transcenden-
tal phenomenology cannot encounter and draw from the real being and
concreteness of the entity in question.37
Heidegger’s early argumentation employs the lived and interpretive
“categories of life”—a Diltheyan idea that contests the ahistorical, static
categories of consciousness and the reductive interpretation of reason
offered by traditional transcendental philosophy, and a forerunner to the
existential categories or “existentials” unfolded in Being and Time—and,
more fundamentally, logos; that is, the communicative event and enact-
ment of factical existence in and through the constitutive medium of
language.38 It is in this situation that Heidegger redefined the transcen-
dental dimension of his project by the mid-1920s as an existential-
ontological one, which would provide a prior basis to history and nature,
interpretation and explanation, by exploring the quasi-transcendental
constitution of human existence as communication, event, and
enactment.39
The “concrete” issues of life are not addressed by remaining at that level
of understanding of consciousness, for Heidegger. They demand a radi-
cally ontological thinking achieved through strategies such as “formal
34 For instance, see GA 60:13.
35GA 20:145–6; translation from Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 106.
36GA 20:138–9; translation from History of the Concept of Time, 101.
37GA 20:146–8; see History of the Concept of Time, 106–8.
38 See my “Biological and Historical Life,” 22.
39GA 61:173.
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indication” and hermeneutical anticipation that poses the question of
one’s own life/existence in relation to the question of the meaning of
being. This would be articulated through his hermeneutics of authentic
and inauthentic speech, logos as revealing and as concealing, which he
unfolded in confrontation with Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the lecture
courses on the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (1924) and
Plato’s Sophist (1925).40
Heidegger’s thinking of the originariness of language in the mid-
1920s distinguished his project from other prevalent forms of transcen-
dental philosophy that focused on the constitutive role of consciousness
and the self. This indicates the fundamental role of his thinking of
language and, as we will see next, of world as well, which Searle has
depicted as perspectival semanticism. It is, however, the residual trans-
cendental character of Heidegger’s thinking of language, world, and
being that releases it from Searle’s critique.
Transcendental Philosophy and World
The relationship between world-constitution and transcendental philo-
sophy offers a second example of Heidegger’s shifting attitude toward
the transcendental paradigm. In the late 1920s, he identified the truth of
transcendental philosophy with ontology and time as the condition of
the finite subject. Time is the transcendental horizon of the question of
being posed by Dasein. Is this a temporal idealism, as Blattner has
argued?41 It is, to the extent that it is Dasein’s originary temporality
that clarifies the notion of time that happens to it, even if it happens as
inappropriable in moments such as birth and death.
In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, a lecture course from 1928,
Heidegger analyzes the transcendental character of world in Kant’s first
Critique as ontologically what cannot be part of another world or be
40 A particularly helpful work for exploring the priority of language in the 1920s is Scott
M. Campbell, The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).
41 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism.
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reduced to any possible ontic physical world.42 This is an account of the
world as a meaningful whole that is irreducible to any part and a
transcendental thesis about the world that remains the point of depar-
ture for Heidegger’s later thinking of world.43
Heidegger is seen in this same lecture course refining his depiction of the
transcendental paradigm by introducing his conceptions of the transcen-
dental dispersion and dissemination of neutral Dasein into non-neutral
ways of being through thrownness.44 Thrownness is not the ontic fact of
being born but rather the transcendental-ontological structure disclosed
through the facticity of ontic birth. Human finitude and mortality, which
remain crucial to Heidegger’s later understanding of human existence
between heaven and earth, are not merely anthropological facts of human
life; they are a transcendental-ontological condition of meaningfulness and
meaninglessness, instead of a bare, finite, empirical duration of time.
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, transcendental philosophy is
inquiry into the understanding of being emerging from Dasein’s ecstatic
transcendence. In this context, especially in the late 1920s in works such as
“On the Essence ofGround” (1928/29), the transcendental signifiesDasein’s
transcending, or surpassing and overstepping, of limiting structures and the
exposure of being-in-a-world: that is, “transcendence as being-in-the-world”
and “world co-constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence.”45
In “On the Essence of Ground,” Heidegger stated that “world co-
constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence; as belonging to this
structure, the concept of world may be called transcendental. This term
names all that belongs essentially to transcendence and bears its intrinsic
possibility.”46 The co-relational character of mortal and immortal, world
and earth, in their difference and conflict does not eliminate the sense of
42 See the discussion in GA 26:224–5; translation in Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical
Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 175.
43 For an extended assessment of the problematic of world in Heidegger, see Lafont, Heidegger,
Language, and World-Disclosure.
44 See GA 26:173–4; translation in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 138.




the whole that Heidegger here described as transcendental. The idea of
transcendental method continues to be heard in his later notion of way
(Wag) as world-disclosing, which happens to a wanderer on the way to
whom the world is being disclosed. Heidegger’s poetic thinking reso-
nates with the poetic dimensions of the transcendental tradition at work
in Hölderlin and Schelling. World is a meaningful whole: “world is not a
mere collection of the things—countable and uncountable, known and
unknown—that are present at hand,” Heidegger noted in “The Origin
of the Work of Art,” but world is fundamentally world opening and the
worlding of the world.47 The openness of world is a reinterpretation
of the phenomenological account of world-constitution. The world
remains constitutive of meaning, even in the modern epoch in which
the world is darkened and the meaningfulness of things seemingly lost.
Heidegger’s Thinking of Being
We should now turn to the history and event of being and consider
whether it has overcome the transcendental paradigm. The turn in the
mid-1930s was interpreted by Heidegger and his subsequent supporters
as a radical break with the lingering transcendental character of Being
and Time, which continued to forget the question of being by over-
emphasizing the role of the subject in the form of “being-there”
(Dasein). Transcendental philosophy became increasingly identified
after the turn, linking it with the history of being, with the priority of
the subject and subjectivity that were associated with the problems of
modernity. As I discuss in another place, the post-turn Heidegger
persistently conjoins and critiques the transcendental conception of the
subjectivity of the subject and the modern experience of the priority of
the subject as an ahistorical and worldless reification.48
47 Translation from Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, 23.
48Nelson, “What Is Missing?” 211. On the transcendental sense of subjectivity, and posing the
question of subjectivity more radically, compare Heidegger, GA 2:24, 106, 229, 382; GA 26:129,
160, 190, 205, 211; GA 27:11. For Heidegger’s later critique of the subject, see GA 5:243;
GA 69:44; GA 79:101, 139.
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Even after 1935 and the turn toward being, Heidegger continues to
hesitate at times between the rhetoric of radically overcoming transcen-
dental philosophy and the possibility of an alternative, desubjectified
conception of transcendental constitution occurring through the imperso-
nal constitutive media of history, language, and world, rather than con-
stitution occurring through the activity of the subject or Dasein. In a
passage from 1936/37, later published in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry,
Heidegger describes the significance of the constitutive interplay of history,
language, and world for human life: “only where there is language, is there
world, that is, the constantly changing cycle of decision and work, of action
and responsibility, but also of arbitrariness and turmoil, decay and confu-
sion. Only where world holds sway is there history.”49
History, language, and world are not accidental attributes found in
empirical life to be explained by scientific inquiry or understood through
lived-experience. Heidegger sharply distinguishes between contingent
ontic-empirical histories (Historie) and an ontologically (that is, in the
last analysis despite Heidegger’s intentions, transcendentally) condition-
ing history (Geschichte) of being. Language has a transcendental char-
acter in conditioning, structuring, and speaking through the speaker.
The world happens to the finite mortal human subject who is called to
wait and listen for the murmurs of being.
Heidegger’s later thinking might be interpreted as a philosophy of the
transcendental passivity of the subject. Still, it is Dasein that exists in and
from the between (Zwischen) of the ontological difference between being and
entities. This openness and its play of concealment and unconcealment, in
which being is a transcendental field of uncertainty, cannot be fully disclosed
or understood and can even be crossed out and erased. This thinking
transforms and yet cannot fully displace Being and Time’s transcendental
horizon and conditions of the question concerning the sense of being.
According to Heidegger, innerworldly beings are only disclosed and
manifest in the context of the world-clearing of being in which humans
find themselves and which happens prior to any transcendental thinking or
49GA 4:38; translation from Martin Heidegger, Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry (Amherst, NY:
Humanity Books, 2000), 56.
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projection by Dasein or the human subject.50 The transcendental is no
longer located in the conditions and structures of subjectivity, much less of
an epistemological character of a knowing subject. Nonetheless, history’s
historicizing, language’s speaking, and the world’s worlding have a trans-
cendental character in contrast with, for instance, accounts that explain
them as ontic phenomena through natural and material constitution.
Heidegger’s mature thinking of world-opening and world-clearing as an
ontological event would be more primordial than and prior to—and yet,
however, resonates with—the idea of transcendental constitution under-
stood as the conditions of possibility for the relationship between world and
being, on the one hand, and the finite mortal human subject, on the other.
Conclusion
Heidegger’s problematic and tense relationship with transcendental phi-
losophy shapes his early efforts to transform and overcome it, as well as the
trajectory of the question concerning the meaning of being. Based on the
indications briefly discussed above, Heidegger did not embrace or turn to
the historically available alternatives to transcendental philosophy, such as
naturalism and materialism (e.g., physical constitution) or historicism and
social constructivism (e.g., social-cultural constitution). The model of the
transcendental conditions and constitution of the meaningfulness of the
world reverberates throughout his later thinking of a more originary and
primordial world-disclosure and world-clearing.
Meaningfulness appears to be no longer explicitly tied to the meaning-
making activity of the human subject, as being becomes the necessary
condition of possible meaningfulness for humans.51 Being always surpasses
50Compare Martin Heidegger, The Piety of Thinking: Essays (Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1976), 95.
51 For an account of Heidegger that stresses the priority of being over any act of meaning or sense,
and the irreducibility of Sein to Sinn, see Richard Capobianco, Heidegger’s Way of Being (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2014). On the priority of Sinn in interpreting Sein in Heidegger, see
Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2015).
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its historical epochs and human perspectives, such that it is irreducible to
semantic perspectivalism or idealism. Yet it is mortal humans who inter-
pret, poeticize, and dwell in response to and in the context of this event of
being. The non-dual and irreducible relationality of subject and object as a
condition of meaning links Heidegger’s later thinking with transcendental
phenomenology at the same time as he disorients the Husserlian subject.
It is accordingly questionable whether Heidegger: (i) eliminated the
constitutive role of meaning and the subject in projecting it onto being
and the history of its event and epochs, which he persistently distin-
guished from ontic-empirical histories; (ii) achieved a coherent and
experientially appropriate nonrepresentational and non-horizonal
notion of the sense and meaning of being; and (iii) articulated a
philosophy that could be “naturalized” without undermining its very
structure and sense that prioritizes the event of meaning.52
As argued in this chapter, despite his anti-transcendental gestures and
rhetoric, and despite Husserl’s view that Heidegger had betrayed trans-
cendental philosophy for the sake of philosophical anthropology,
Heidegger could not consistently abandon or overcome the problematic
of transcendental philosophy through his displacement of the constitu-
tion of sense and meaning from the subject (Dasein) and its horizon of
meaning to the event and openness of being (Sein), as advocates of his
later thinking have claimed. Heidegger remained too early for being,
insofar as he could not arrive at a purely ontological understanding of
being and its meaning that transcended the philosophy of the subject
and modernity.53
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